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Barrier to Trade or Barrier to Profit?
Why Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme Worries
U.S. Drug Companies
Clive Hamilton, D.Phil.* Buddhima Lokuge, M.P.H.t
and Richard Denniss***
INTRODUCTION
Much of the rhetoric that underpins arguments for "free trade" relies
on the assertion that free trade agreements between nations are "win-win"
arrangements. That is, it focuses on the textbook conclusion that by
reducing trade barriers the total volume of goods and services available for
consumption will increase and that, as a result, people in participating
countries will likely benefit. In reality, free trade agreements are about
winners and losers. Individual industries use their political influence to
fight for or to defend their domestic or international profitability. For
example, in the recently concluded negotiations of a free trade agreement
between the United States and Australia, U.S. sugar farmers succeeded in
convincing U.S. negotiators to defend them against increased import
competition.1 The "win-win" rhetoric was further challenged during those
same negotiations when U.S. pharmaceutical companies convinced U.S.
negotiators to press hard for changes to Australian drug pricing policies
that limit pharmaceutical profits.
For more than a year prior to the completion of the United States-
Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
lobby group, PhRMA,2 and its Australian counterpart, Medicines Australia,3
* Clive Hamilton is Executive Director of The Australia institute.
t Buddhima Lokuge is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Medical School of tie
Australian National University.
*** Richard Denniss is Deputy Director of The Australia Institute.
1. See, e.g., Michael Schroeder, Sugar Growers Hold Up Push For Free Trade, WALL ST.J.,
Feb. 3, 2004, at A13.
2. PhRMA refers to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. See
Who We Are, PhRMA, at http://www.phrma.org/whoweare/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
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mounted a campaign to convince both the Australian public and the U.S.
negotiators that the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) is a
barrier to trade. PhRMA and Medicines Australia argued that reform was
necessary in order to deliver the "win-win" benefits of free trade to both
Australian consumers and U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers.
However, the changes to the PBS desired by U.S. manufacturers would
result in the transfer of between $1.0 and $2.4 billion Australian dollars
(AUD) per year in the form of higher medicine prices and profits.4
Moreover, Australia does not have any trade barriers that restrict the sale of
pharmaceuticals. Like all developed countries, Australia has requirements
to ensure that all pharmaceuticals sold to the public are safe,5 but these
requirements apply equally to drugs developed in Australia or the United
States. Australia imposes neither tariffs nor quotas on the importation of
pharmaceuticals.
Since the final text of the FTA has not yet been released, we can not
fully evaluate the outcome of the pharmaceutical industry's campaign. 6 It
appears, however, that Australia has promised to make some changes to
the PBS.v At the very least, the attack on the PBS provides a compelling
example of the way in which free trade arguments are enlisted to
undermine social policies that act not as barriers to trade, but to excess
profit.
3. Medicines Australia, at http://www.medicinesaustralia.com (last visited May 17,
2004).
4. K LOKUGE & RICHARD DENNISS, TRADING IN OUR HEALTH SYSTEM? THE IMPACT OF THE
AUSTRALIA-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME vii-ix (The
Austl. Inst., Discussion Paper, No. 55, 2003), available at
http://www.tai.org.au/PublicationsFiles/DPFiles/DP55suma.pdf. At the time of
publication,
1 AUD = U.S.$0.76. This value was determined using The Universal Currency Converter, at
http://www.xe.com/ucc/. Therefore, the changes sought by U.S. pharmaceutical
companies would cost Australians between $765,000,000 and $1,835,000,000.
5. SeeAUSTL.DEP'T OF HEALTH & AGEING, 1995 GUIDELINES FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY ON PREPARATION OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, http://www.health.gov.au/pbs/general/pubs/pharmpac/gusubpac.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2004).
6. Editor's Note: Since the writing of this Case Study, the agreement was signed (on
May 18, 2004 ) and subsequently the final text was released; it is available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us-fta/final-text/index.html (last visited July
1, 2004).
7. See infra text accompanying note 34.
IV:2 (2004)
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THE AUSTRALIAN PBS SYSTEM
The Australian PBS is recognized internationally as a superior
pharmaceutical pricing scheme. Professor Richard Laing of Boston
University's School of Public Health has stated that "Australia... is the one
country which seems to have got it right, that what you want to do in
controlling costs is to pay what the drugs are therapeutically worth. And
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme does that."8
Australia's PBS scheme was established in 1948 in response to
concerns that not all Australians could afford vital new medicines such as
penicillin." Since then, the scheme has developed as a multibillion dollar
subsidy to health consumers-consumers are required to pay a maximum
co-payment of AUD$23.10, or AUD$3.70 for low income earners, and the
federal government funds any difference between the maximum co-
payment and the full price paid to the pharmaceutical company.l0
Because the Australian federal government is responsible for the
difference between the price of the drug paid to the pharmaceutical
company and the co-payment made by citizens, it is in the Australian
government's interest to minimize the prices paid for medicines. It is the
effect of the PBS on prices that is of greatest concern to American drug
companies. However, seeking approval for listing on the PBS is only
necessary if drug companies, domestic or foreign, wish to avail themselves
of the benefits of the Australian subsidy scheme."
For a new drug to be listed on the PBS, approval for its sale must first
be obtained from the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), roughly
the equivalent of the United States' Food and Drug Administration. In
assessing a request for the approval of a new drug the TGA is required to
consider, among other things, the product's quality, safety and efficacy. If
the TGA approves the drug for sale within Australia, the supplier may then
apply to have the new drug listed for subsidization on the PBS. It is
important to point out that a new drug that has been approved for sale by
the TGA can be sold, without subsidy, within Australia. It is only necessary
for a pharmaceutical company to seek to have their drug listed on the PBS
8. 7.30 Report: Australian Benefits Scheme Upsets US Drug Companies (ABC radio broadcast,
Feb. 27, 2001), http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/s252447.htm.
9. LOKUGE & DENNISS, supra note 4, at 5; AUSTL. PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, THE
PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME-AN OVERVIEW, at
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/SP/pbs.htm (last updatedJan. 2, 2003).
10. AUSTL. PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, supra note 9.
11. See id.
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if they wish to be eligible for the federal government subsidy. 2
To ensure that a new drug is eligible for subsidy under the PBS, a
supplier must apply to the Pharmaceutical Benefit Advisory Committee
(PBAC), a committee of experts whose role it is to assess applications for
listing on the PBS against a number of criteria, including: the need for the
product; the outcomes and costs of a particular pharmaceutical when
weighed against other available therapies; and whether any restrictions
should be imposed on new listings, such as limits on the number of items
that may be prescribed or restrictions on the indications for which a PBS
subsidy is available. 3 The National Health Act [of] 1953 specifies that the
PBAC must consider whether a new drug addresses an unmet medical
need or provides a significant improvement in efficacy or a reduction in
toxicity over drugs already listed, and is of acceptable cost-effectiveness.'
4
This provision is important as it aims to ensure that new drugs will be listed
only if there is evidence that an improved outcome for patients and the
community will be delivered.
Once a new drug has been listed by the PBAC, the Pharmaceutical
Benefits Pricing Authority (PBPA) negotiates the price that should be paid
to the manufacturer. 5 The PBPA may also stipulate conditions of use, such
as restrictions on prescription to specific groups. The Department of
Health is then responsible for negotiating a price with the drug supplier.
The federal government makes the final decision whether to list the drug
at the negotiated price.
6
U.S. DRUG COMPANIES' CONCERNS WITH AUSTRALIA'S PBS SYSTEM
Pharmaceutical companies are opposed to Australia's approach to
price determination, describing the impact of the PBS on the pricing of
pharmaceuticals as "insidious." 7 Drug manufacturers in the United States
12. See id.
13. Austl. Dep't of Health & Ageing, Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee, at
http://www.health.gov.au/pbs/general/listing/committee.htm#pbac (last updated Dec.
16, 2003).
14. AusTL. DEP'T OF HEALTH & AGEING, GUIDELINES FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
ON THE PREPARATION OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE PBAC: PART 1 (Feb. 4, 2003), at
http://www.health.gov.au/pbs/pharm/pubs/guidelines/partl.htm.
15. AUSTL. PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, supra note 9.
16. See LOKUGE & DENNISS, supra note 4, at 8-9.
17. MEDICINES AUSTL., A PREScRIPTION FOR THE FUTURE HEALTH OF AUSTRALIA:
SUBMISSION TO THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE PREPARING A REPORT ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PBS 25 (2002), http://www.medicinesaustralia.com.au/.
IV:2 (2004)
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have also expressed concern with the "overriding focus on cost-
effectiveness" of the PBS and have taken issue with the Australian
requirement that "[t] o obtain a premium, the applicant must demonstrate
significant clinical advantages over its main comparator and satisfactory
cost-effectiveness versus that comparator."'8
The explicit purpose of Australia's PBS is to ensure that
pharmaceuticals are affordable for both individual patients and Australian
taxpayers. The use of the government's buying power, combined with
expert advice on both efficacy and cost effectiveness, ensures that
Australian citizens have access to some of the cheapest prescription drugs
in the developed world. Residents of the United States sometimes pay up
to ten times as much as Australians for identical pharmaceuticals.' 9
While the PBS is highly effective in lowering the prices paid for
pharmaceuticals, it does not, in any way, act as a barrier to trade. As
indicated above, the PBS contains no tariff or quota barriers and does not
treat domestically designed or manufactured pharmaceuticals any
differently from imported substances; moreover, it is not necessary for
drugs to be listed on the PBS in order for them to be sold in Australia.
20 It
appears that the main concern that pharmaceutical manufacturers have
with the Australian PBS scheme is that it is effective in countering both the
market power and information asymmetry between customers and
suppliers that usually exists within the pharmaceutical industry. Of even
greater concern to pharmaceutical companies, it seems, is the possibility
that other countries-and even some states within the United States-may
implement schemes similar to Australia's.
THE ECONOMICS OF THE PBS
The pharmaceutical industry is characterized by extensive market
failure. That is, in the absence of comprehensive government regulation,
the industry does not efficiently design, manufacture and distribute
pharmaceutical products. The first major form of market failure is due to
18. PHRMA, 2003 SUBMISSION TO THE US TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2003),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/australia/phrma-au-2
0 0 3.html.
19. See BUDDHIMA LOKUGE & CLIVE HAMILTON, THE AusTL. INST., COMPARING DRUG PRICES
IN AUSTRALIA AND THE USA: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE US-AuSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
5 (Jul. 2003), available at
http://www.tai.org.au/Publications-Fies/Papers&Sub-Fies/Drug%20comparisons.pdf.
20. It should be noted, however, that the vast majority of prescriptions are covered by
the PBS due to the substantial cost advantage that PBS drugs have over non-subsidized
medicines.
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the "public good" nature of new pharmaceutical substances. Organizations
involved in pharmaceutical research and development face substantial
private costs associated with developing new products-in the absence of
patent protection, pharmaceutical manufacturers could "free ride" on the
costly research of an innovator. Thus, without patents, firms would be
unwilling to invest sufficient resources in the development of new drugs. In
order to create an incentive for the development of new medicines,
governments-including the Australian and U.S. governments-provide
pharmaceutical companies with the patent right to become a monopoly
provider of their new product.
The PBS relies on the monopsony buying power of the Australian
government to counter the monopoly selling power possessed by
pharmaceutical manufacturers with patent protection. The notion that
unregulated market outcomes are efficient, be they within countries or
between them, is based on the notion of perfect competition.' In a
perfectly competitive market, it is assumed that there are large numbers of
buyers and sellers and that no buyer or seller has any bargaining power.
When a seller has monopoly power, as is the case in the Australian
pharmaceutical industry where products are protected from competition
by twenty-year patents, providing the buyer with "countervailing bargaining
power" will result in a more efficient outcome than if the monopolist is
allowed to use its power against a large number of small buyers.
22
The need to encourage innovation is not the only form of market
failure evident in the pharmaceutical industry. Another important form of
market failure, one which pharmaceutical companies appear much less
concerned about, is the substantial asymmetry that exists between
consumers and manufacturers concerning the relative therapeutic worth
of alternate forms of treatment. Individuals are simply not best placed to
make decisions about which products to purchase: They are unlikely to
have either the resources or analytical ability to compare systematically the
costs and benefits of a wide range of pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical treatments for a given condition. As patents allow
pharmaceutical companies to act as monopolists, the profit maximizing
strategy for a pharmaceutical company is to take advantage of the lack of
information on the part of the consumer and set prices based on "what the
market can bear" rather than based on the therapeutic worth of the
product or the cost of development. The Australian PBS plays an
important role in addressing this information asymmetry.
21. SeePAULA. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NoRDHAus, ECONOMics 46 (12th ed. 1985).
22. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMics 365-66 (4th ed. 1998).
IV:2 (2004)
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It is difficult, if not impossible, for average health consumers to collect,
evaluate and analyze all the information necessary to compare competing
forms of treatment for an illness with which they have been diagnosed.
They are therefore unlikely to be able to act like the rational, well-
informed consumers described in economics textbooks. Furthermore,
while doctors may be sufficiently well informed about the efficacy of
alternate courses of treatment, individual physicians are unlikely to be able
to comparatively compute their marginal costs and benefits-particularly
as the costs are not borne directly by the physician, but rather by either
patients or taxpayers; for such a level of reasoned decisionmaking,
guidance from a body such as the PBAC is essential. Indeed, the PBS uses a
team of experts to make judgments about the relative merits of alternative
pharmaceutical substances. 3 Such a system not only ensures that those with
the relevant expertise conduct the comparisons, but also ensures that the
costs of conducting the analysis are pooled across all health consumers.
Ironically, despite the contention that the PBS reduces the incentives
for innovation, the scheme's heavy reliance on comparative cost-benefit
analyses actually promises that only innovative products that deliver
demonstrable benefits will receive the benefits of subsidies-thereby
aiming to discourage the development of "copy cat" (or "me-too") drugs.
Drug pricing systems that do not make extensive use of such economic
analyses provide an incentive for pharmaceutical companies to invest
heavily in advertising (to take advantage of the information asymmetry
between manufacturers and consumers) rather than product innovation
(which would be rewarded by a cost-benefit analysis if new benefits could
be demonstrated). In a typical market where individual buyers are poorly
informed, the development of "copy cat" drugs, backed up by substantial
advertising expenditures to achieve superficial product differentiation, is
likely to be a more profitable strategy than the development of new
substances.
Finally, it is necessary to address the contention that policies such as
23. Once again, it is important to note that if an individual disagrees with a decision not
to list a drug for subsidy on the PBS, he or she is free to purchase that drug, at the price
chosen by the pharmaceutical company, as long as it has been deemed safe by the TGA. See
infra text accompanying note 12.
24. Despite the attempts of some in the United States to introduce reforms to the
pharmaceutical industry designed to lower consumer prices, the U.S. federal government
has actually legislated to prohibit the use of economic evaluations through the Medicare
Modernization Improvement Act of 2003. See, e.g., Rosa L. DeLauro, DeLauro Spearheads
Letter to Trade Rep. Zoellick Regarding Rx Drug Reimportation (Dec. 15, 2003),
http://www.house.gov/delauro/press/2003/Zoellick-letter_12-16_03.html.
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the Australian PBS drive up pharmaceutical prices in other, less regulated,
markets. While high rates of profit in the pharmaceutical industry are
typically defended as being necessary in order to fund more research and
development,25  it is neither obvious, nor inevitable, that higher
pharmaceutical prices in Australia will result in increased research and
development or lower pharmaceutical prices in the United States. The only
reason that a for-profit company would pass on the benefits of higher
prices or lower costs achieved in one market to consumers in another
market was if they were under competitive pressure to do so. While it is
possible that drug companies could chose to redistribute the gains they
make from Australian consumers to U.S. consumers, it is also possible, and
more likely, that they would pass any gains made in Australia direcdy to
their U.S. shareholders instead.26 It is worth noting that, in Australia, U.S.
drug companies are continuing to maintain that the United States-
Australia FTA will not lead to an increase in the prices paid by Australian
consumers. 27 Putting aside the merits of this assertion, it seems inconsistent
for the drug companies to simultaneously maintain that there will be no
increase in drug prices (and thus, that it is in Australia's interests to sign
the FTA), while suggesting that the FTA will result in a fairer worldwide
distribution of the costs of pharmaceutical research and development.
THE PBS AND THE UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA FTA
Despite the fact that the PBS does not, in any way, act as a barrier to
trade between Australia and the United States, the office of the U.S. Trade
25. For example, the industry is fond of citingJoseph DiMasi's estimates of the high
cost of drug research and development. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price ofInnovation: New
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). For responses to DiMasi's
methods and calculations, see ROBERT YOUNG & MICHAEL SURRUSCO, Rx R&D MYTHS: THE
CASE AGAINST THE DRUG INDUSTRY'S "SCARE CARD" (2001) (responding to DiMasi's original
study) and Richard G. Frank, Editorial, New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22J. HEALTH
ECON. 325 (2003).
26. If anything, it is competition that ensures that prices fall, not higher profits
extracted in other markets. However, competition within the U.S. drug industry has not
prevented it from remaining the most profitable industry in the United States over the past
ten years. See FAMILIES USA, PROFITING FROM PAIN: WHERE PRESCRIPTION DRUG DOLLARS GO
(July 2002), http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/PPreport.pdPdoclD=249. It is
unlikely that any gains to pharmaceutical companies from Australian consumers would be
redirected to the pockets of U.S. consumers.
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Representative stated in its 2003 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers: "Research-based U.S. pharmaceutical firms are
disadvantaged by several Australian Government policies. These include a
reference pricing system that ties the price of an innovative U.S. medicine
to the lowest price medicine in the same therapeutic or chemical group,
regardless of patent status of the medicines."'2 8
There is no doubt that drug companies are adversely affected by the
fact that the Australian government refers to the prices of existing
alternatives when deciding how much it is willing to pay for a new drug;
that is, after all, the objective of the PBS. But this disadvantage, in the form
of lower profits, is not derived from any barrier to trade. It is derived from
the implementation, in Australia, of a pharmaceutical pricing scheme
designed explicitly to counter the bargaining power of all pharmaceutical
companies over their customers.
United States-based pharmaceutical interests also sought to change
Australia's intellectual property (IP) laws through the United States-
Australia FTA in order to extend the period of time during which drugs
were protected from low-cost generic pharmaceuticals. 9 While there was
no attempt to extend the actual twenty year patent life of pharmaceuticals,
there was an attempt to change IP laws to impede manufacturers of
generic pharmaceuticals from getting their products on to the market as
soon as the twenty year patent life ended.3 0 The practice by generic
manufacturers of using the data collected by the patent holder to convince
regulators of the safety and efficacy of a substance is known as
"springboarding," and is officially recognized by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) .3 As the following quotation from the U.S. Trade
Representative shows, pharmaceutical companies have convinced U.S.
trade negotiators that the ability to use old test data is a barrier to trade:
"The Australian Government is considering allowing 'springboarding,'
allowing generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to begin trials and
production of pharmaceuticals so that these drugs can receive immediate
patent approval and can be sold immediately after a patent expires."32 By
28. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2003 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 12 (2003), http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2003/australia.pdf.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. The WTO upheld Canada's right to allow a "Regulatory Review Exception" to
patent law. World Trade Org., Panel on Canada, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, WT/DS114/R, at 146-48 (Mar. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf.
32. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 28, at 11.
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delaying the launch of generic competition, patent holders can extend the
period over which they receive the high prices that patents deliver. It has
been estimated that for every extra year that generic drugs can be kept out
of the Australian market the profits made by drug companies will increase
by one billion Australian dollars.33
At the time of writing, the text of the FTA negotiated between
Australia and the United States has not been made available for public
scrutiny. It is, however, illustrative of the lack of transparency in the
process that summaries of the deal released by the Australian and U.S.
administrations differ substantially on the issue of negotiated changes to
the PBS. The U.S. Trade Representative's website states: "Australia will
make a number of improvements in its Pharmaceuticals Benefits Scheme
(PBS) procedures that will enhance transparency and accountability in the
operation of the PBS, including establishment of an independent process
to review determinations of product listings.3 4 Yet, the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade simply states: "The
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), in particular the price and listing




Australia's PBS is a highly effective and efficient public policy device
that provides Australian citizens with some of the lowest pharmaceutical
prices in the developed world. However, the effectiveness of the PBS has
drawn criticisms from the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and, in turn, from
the office of the U.S. Trade Representative that threaten its future.
As highlighted earlier, if Australian citizens paid as much for their
pharmaceuticals as their counterparts in the United States the cost of
purchasing pharmaceuticals would increase by between AUD$1 and
AUD$2.4 billion per year;36 further, if the pharmaceutical companies
succeed in achieving changes to IP laws to delay the introduction of
generics after the expiry of patents, the cost is likely to exceed AUD$1
33. LOKUGE & DENNISS, supra note 4 at 2.
34. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FREE TRADE "DowN UNDER": SUMMARY OF THE U.S.-
AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Feb. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2004/02/2004-02-08-factsheet-australia.pdf.
35. AUSTRADE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES (Feb. 9, 2004), available
at http://www.austrade.gov.au/corporate/layout/0,0_Sl-iCORPXID0054-2_-
3_PWB110416012-4_-5 -6 -7_,00.html.
36. LOKUGE & DENNISS, supra note 4, at ix.
IV:2 (2004)
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billion per year."'
While such sums of money are no doubt substantial, they are far more
likely to affect public health in Australia than to impact the pharmaceutical
industry. These numbers are simply not so large when viewed in terms of
the industry's global profits; for example, in 2001 the ten largest U.S. drug
companies had a combined revenue of $U.S.167 billion. 3 However, an
increase of this magnitude would represent a highly significant change in
the Australian government's expenditure on pharmaceuticals, as at present
the cost to the government of pharmaceutical subsidies is on the order of
five billion Australian dollars. It has been estimated that the price charged
to patients would need to nearly double, or the government would have to
exact tax increases.3 9 As discussed below, such an increase in the cost of
pharmaceuticals to patients is likely to have a serious impact on public
health.
The biggest threat to the pharmaceutical industry posed by the PBS is
arguably not its minimal impact on global pharmaceutical profits, but it's
appeal as an approach and the corresponding threat that other countries
may begin to implement similar schemes. While the United States-Australia
FTA does not provide a direct mechanism for drug companies to affect the
pharmaceutical schemes of other counties, the negotiation process
highlights the likely pressures that other countries will face should they
seek to limit prices in any way. All countries, including the United States
itself,0 are struggling to reconcile consumers' demand for new medicines
(many of which are very expensive) and the need to have equitable access
to them, with the desire to keep taxes and public expenditure low. One of
37. BUDDHIMA LOKUGE ET AL., A BACKDOOR TO HIGHER MEDICINE PRICES? INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE AUSTRALiA-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.tai.org.au/WhatsNew Files/WhatsNew/Patents.pdf.
38. FAMILIES USA, supra note 26.
39. LOKUGE & DENNISS, supra note 4, at x.
40. Commenting on the problems faced by state governments in the United States, New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer said recently, "New Yorkers face a health-care crisis - a
crisis driven to a large degree by the enormous growth in the cost of prescription drugs.
This cost is eroding individual's health care and is a large factor in the massive state deficit."
Eric Durr, GlaxoSmithKline Charged with Inflating Prices, TRIANGLE BUS.J., Feb. 13, 2003,
available at http://triangle.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/2003/02/1O/daily37.html.
Even President Bush's brother, Florida GovernorJeb Bush, has stated that "[p]rotecting the
large profit margins for the multibillion-dollar pharmaceutical companies is not a priority.
We are more concerned about making sure our senior citizens have better access to
affordable prescription drugs." Jeff Tieman, A Formulary in Progress, Florida Panel Will Make
Regular Changes to Medicaid List of Preferred Drugs, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 10, 2001.
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the easiest ways to reconcile these competing objectives is to follow
Australia's lead and to restrict the price associated with new medicines.
In recent years the United States has shifted much of its international
trade focus away from multilateral agreements and towards bilateral
agreements. 4' The FTA between Australia and the United States was one of
the first bilateral agreements between the United States and a developed
country. The willingness of the United States negotiating team to pursue
the operation of social policies within Australia, rather than to confine
itself to issues of tariffs and quotas, is therefore likely to signal the nature
of subsequent FTAs negotiated by the United States. The United States-
Australia FTA negotiations were explicitly used as a mechanism for
watering down Australia's PBS system.
While the notion that low cost production techniques will spread
rapidly between countries engaged in trade with each other is widely
accepted, the view that all countries should converge upon uniform modes
of social service provision is, perhaps, less widely held. It is therefore
important to consider the implications of the inclusion of social policies in
FTAs between developed countries as, over time, differences that have
developed to meet the differing democratic preferences of counties may
be difficult to maintain.
The Australian PBS, with its combination of government subsidy, cost-
benefit based price control, and low up-front prices for consumers
(particularly concession card holders) ensure that drug prices do not
create a significant barrier for Australians seeking medical treatment.
According to one source, while sixteen percent of elderly residents of the
United States spent more than one hundred U.S. dollars per month on
prescription drugs, no elderly Australians spent that much despite the
proportion of the populations that required them to take prescription
medicines being quite similar.42
Access to affordable pharmaceuticals provides an important plank on
which equity is delivered in Australia and is an essential component of the
country's health system. Movement towards a system in which the
chronically ill and the elderly are asked to pay higher prices will reduce
41. See, e.g., JOHN AUDLEY, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, BAD BILATERAL TRADE
DEALS ARE No BETTER THAN BAD MULTILATERAL DEALs (Oct. 2003),
http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/issuebriefoct2003.pdf.
42. CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., THE ELDERLY'S EXPERIENCES WITH HEALTH CARE IN FIVE
NATIONS: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1999 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH POLICY
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public health outcomes, as well as equity, and will increase expenditures in
other areas of the health budget, such as hospitals, where the adverse
consequences of patients failing to take appropriate medicines will become
apparent.
CONCLUSION
The PBS is not a barrier to trade; it is a barrier to excessive profits
from the sale of pharmaceuticals in Australia. The PBS relies on the
intervention of the government, on behalf of health consumers, to counter
the monopoly power that patents provide to pharmaceutical
manufacturers and to assist with reducing the information asymmetry
between individual health consumers or providers and pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
The U.S. trade negotiators showed themselves to be more than willing
to act on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry in negotiating an FTA with
Australia. When the final text of the FTA is released, it will be possible to
evaluate more comprehensively the wins that have been achieved and
losses that have been suffered. It seems that Australia has granted some
concessions, including the establishment of a new appeals body. It does
not seem incautious to predict that the changes negotiated as part of the
FTA between Australia and the United States will likely result in higher
prices for Australian consumers and higher profits for drug companies.
On a broader level, perhaps the most dangerous precedent that has
been established in the United States-Australia FTA is that it now appears
that even developed countries such as Australia may be susceptible to
sacrificing their social policies in pursuit of improved access to the U.S.
marketplace. In bilateral trade agreements, the far superior bargaining
power of the United States may be too much for foreign governments to
resist, especially when the full costs of their concessions will not be felt for
some time.
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